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FAMILY LAW- A PROFESSIONAL DEGREE OR LICENSE ACQUIRED DURING MARRIAGE IS NOT MARITAL PROPERTY
SUBJECT TO EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION UNDER THE PROPERTY DISPOSITION IN ANNULMENT AND DIVORCE LAW.
Archer v. Archer, 303 Md. 347, 493 A.2d 1074 (1985).
The parties were married while the husband was a medical student. 1
In order to support the couple and the two children born during the
marriage, the wife discontinued her education and worked full-time
while the husband completed his medical education. 2 During the marriage the husband acquired a medical degree and license, and completed
two years of residency. After seven years of marriage, the couple was
divorced by decree of the Circuit Court of Maryland for Prince George's
County. 3 The court awarded the wife $100 per month alimony for a
period not to exceed one year, but denied the wife's prayer for a monetary award based upon the value of the medical degree. 4 The court held
that neither a medical degree nor license is marital property under Maryland's Property Disposition in Annulmnent and Divorce Law (Act). 5
The wife appealed the decision on two alternative theories: 6 (1) when
there is no marital property to distribute, a medical degree and license
are marital property under the Act; or (2) restitution should be awarded
for her contributions to her husband's acquisition of a medical degree
and license. On certiorari,7 the Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed
and noted that restitution was unnecessary because the wife's contributions to the medical degree were considered by the trial court in making
its alimony award. 8
Forty-three jurisdictions provide for equitable distribution of marital property upon the dissolution of a marriage. 9 Under equitable distri1. Archer v Archer, 303 Md. 347, 349, 493 A.2d 1074, 1075 (1985).
2. /d. The husband, however, also received financial support from the Navy. While he
was a medical student, the Navy paid Thomas Archer's tuition and a monthly stipend of not more than $500. During his summer vacations, he also earned approximately $1500 each year. !d.
3. The couple was granted a divorce a vinculo matrimonii on July 12, 1984. /d. at 350,
493 A.2d at 1076.
4. /d. The wife also was awarded custody of the couple's two children, and child
support of $250 per month per child. At the time of the divorce proceedings, the
wife earned $15,000 per year and the husband earned $19,000 per year. Brief for
Appellant at 2-3, Archer v. Archer, 303 Md. 347, 493 A.2d 1074 (1985).
5. Archer, 303 Md. at 350, 493 A.2d at 1076. The Maryland Property Disposition in
Annulment and Divorce Law is contained in Mo. FAM. LAW CODE ANN.§§ 8-201
to -213 (1984 & Supp. 1986). The 1986 amendments to the Act do not address
professional degrees. See infra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
6. Appellant's Brief at 4, Archer v. Archer, 303 Md. 347, 493 A.2d 1074 (1985).
7. The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari to decide this issue of first
impression prior to consideration of the issue by the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland. Archer v. Archer, 302 Md. 409, 488 A.2d 500 (1985).
8. Archer, 303 Md. at 359, 493 A.2d at 1081.
9. 1985 Survey of American Family Law, 11 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 3021 (May 7,
1985). Forty-two states and the District of Columbia have adopted, either by statute or judicial fiat, a system of equitable distribution upon divorce of property acquired during marriage. The remaining eight states (Arizona, California, Idaho,
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bution principles, property acquired during marriage, regardless of how
it is titled, is "marital property." 10 Whether a professional degree acquired by one spouse during marriage is marital property subject to equitable distribution has engendered considerable debate 11 and litigation 12 in
what has been called the "university degree-divorce decree" case. 13
The overwhelming majority of jurisdictions addressing this issue

10.

11.

12.

13.

Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and Washington) are community property
jurisdictions. Id. Community property is premised upon a presumption of equal
contributions by both spouses to a marriage. Co-ownership of property acquired
during the marriage vests in each spouse by virtue of the marital relationship. See
generally Comment, A Property Theory of Future Earning Potential in Dissolution
Proceedings, 56 WASH. L. REV. 277 (1981).
See, e.g., Mo. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 8-201(e) (1984 & Supp. 1986); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 23 § 401(e) (Purdon Supp. 1986); see Falise v. Falise, 63 Md. App. 574,
580, 493 A.2d 385, 388 (1985) ("Marital property is merely a term created by the
legislature to describe the status of property acquired during the marriage, however
titled ... the only function of 'marital property' is to form a base for a 'monetary
award'.").
The issue has been called "the raging issue in matrimonial law." The Nat'! L.J.,
Nov. 28, 1983, at 1, col. 2. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick & Doucette, Can the Economic
Value of an Education Really be Measured? A Guide for Marital Property Dissolution, 21 J. FAM. L. 511 (1982-83); Herring, Divisibility of Advanced Degrees in Equitable Distribution States, 19 J. MAR. L. REV. 1 (1985); Krauskopf, Recompense for
Financing Spouse's Education: Legal Protection for the Marital Investor in Human
Capital, 28 KAN. L. REV. 379 (1980); Loeb & McCann, Dilemma v. Paradox: Valuation of an Advanced Degree Upon Dissolution of a Marriage, 66 MARQ. L. REv. 495
(1983); Moore, Should a Professional Degree be Considered a Marital Asset Upon
Divorce?, 15 AKRON L. REv. 543 (1982); Raggio, Professional Goodwill and Professional Licenses as Property Subject to Distribution Upon Dissolution of Marriage, 16,
Number 2, FAM. L.Q. 147 (1982).
See, e.g., In reMarriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978); In re Marriage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978); Inman v. Inman, 648 S.W.2d
847 (Ky. 1982); DeLaRosa v. DeLaRosa, 309 N.W.2d 755 (Minn. 1981); Hubbard
v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747 (Okla. 1979); Saint-Pierre v. Saint-Pierre, 357 N.W.2d
250 (S.D. 1984).
Haugan v. Haugan, 117 Wis. 2d 200, 206, 343 N.W.2d 796, 799-800 (1984). See
also Mahoney v. Mahoney, 182 N.J. Super. 598, 610, 442 A.2d 1062, 1067 ("career
threshold, no-asset" divorce), rev'd, 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527 (1982); Stevens v.
Stevens, 233 Ohio St. 2d 115, 116,492 N.E.2d 131, 132 (1986) ("diploma dilemma"); Raggio, supra note 11, at 147 ("putting hubby through syndrome").
The issue in community property states is the same, but the terminology is
different; the term "marital property" is replaced by "community property." Community property states also cite equitable distribution cases for support. See Pyeatte
v. Pyeatte, 135 Ariz. 346, 661 P.2d 196 (Ct. App. 1982) (citing equitable distribution cases from Colorado, Kentucky, Minnesota, Oklahoma, and Wisconsin). Accordingly, equitable distribution states cite community property cases for support.
See Saint-Pierre, 357 N.W.2d 250 (citing community property cases from Arizona
and Texas).
In the typical "university degree-divorce decree" case, one spouse agrees to
forego education and to support the other spouse, who pursues an advanced degree.
Both parties anticipate that the degree will allow them to share a higher standard of
living in the future. Upon acquisition of the degree, when the student spouse is
ready to realize the income from the couple's investment, the couple divorces. Because the working spouse's income was consumed by the couple's living expenses
and the student spouse's educational expenses, little or no tangible marital property
was accumulated during the marriage. The degreed spouse's enhanced earning ca-

366

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 16

hold that the degree is not marital property. 14 These courts follow the
leading case, In reMarriage ofGraham, 15 in which the Supreme Court of
Colorado held that a professional degree is not marital property because
it does not fall within the traditional definition of property. 16 Unlike
tangible property, a professional degree has no exchange value and cannot be assigned, transferred, or purchased,I7 Its value depends, not upon
mere possession, but upon the future personal efforts, motivation, and
opportunities presented to the holder. 18 Some courts expand upon this
reasoning and assert that the degree's value is too speculative to ascertain.19 In addition, distribution of the degree's value requires a valuation

14.

15.
16.
17.
18.

19.

pacity is often the only valuable asset of the marriage. Haugan, 117 Wis. 2d at 206,
343 N.W.2d at 799-800.
The "university degree-divorce decree" case is distinguished from one where,
although the professional degree is attained under similar circumstances, the marriage is of longer duration and the couple accumulates tangible marital assets that
can be equitably distributed by the court. See Wisner v. Wisner, 129 Ariz. 333, 341,
631 P.2d 115, 123 (1981).
In reMarriage of Weinstein, 128 Ill. App. 3d 234, 239,470 N.E.2d 551, 555 (1984).
E.g., Hughes v. Hughes, 438 So. 2d 146 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Ruben v. Ruben,
123 N.H. 358, 361, 461 A.2d 733, 735 (1983); Mahoney, 91 N.J. at 496, 453 A.2d at
531; Stevens, 23 Ohio St. 3d at 117, 492 N.E.2d at 133; Hubbard, 603 P.2d at 750;
Grosskopf v. Grosskopf, 677 P.2d 814 (Wyo. 1984).
194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978).
In reMarriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429,432, 574 P.2d 75,77 (1978). (The court
split 4-3 and a strong dissent was filed.).
/d.
/d. The Graham court's often quoted language is:
An educational degree, such as an MBA, is simply not encompassed even
by the broad views of the concept of 'property.' It does not have an exchange value or any objective transferable value on an open market. It is
personal to the holder. It terminates on death of the holder and is not
inheritable. It cannot be assigned, sold, transferred, conveyed, or pledged.
An advanced degree is a cumulative product of many years of previous
education, combined with diligence and hard work. It may not be acquired by the mere expenditure of money. It is simply an intellectual
achievement that may potentially assist in the future acquisition of property. In our view, it has none of the attributes of property in the usual
sense of that term.
/d. The court also stated that the contribution by one spouse toward the professional degree of the other spouse is but one of several factors to be considered by the
court in two situations: (1) if marital property is distributed, and (2) if maintenance
is awarded. /d. at 433, 574 P.2d at 78. As the dissent pointed out, however, neither
situation applied to the Grahams. Other than Mr. Graham's MBA degree, the
couple had accumulated no assets during their marriage because their funds had
been expended on their living expenses and on Mr. Graham's education. /d. (Carrigan, J., dissenting). Furthermore, the Colorado statute restricts maintenance to
cases where the party is incapable of self-support: by supporting the couple during
their marriage, Mrs. Graham demonstrated an ability to support herself; therefore,
she was not entitled to alimony. /d. at 435, 574 P.2d at 78-79 (Carrigan, J.,
dissenting).
Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 496, 453 A.2d 527, 532 (1982) ("Valuing a
professional degree in the hands of any particular individual at the start of his or her
career would involve a gamut of calculation that reduces to little more than guesswork."). But see Thomas v. Thomas, 131 Mich. App. 830, 346 N.W.2d 595 (1985)
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and distribution of projected future earnings. 20 This violates equitable
distribution principles that require distribution of property acquired during the marriage. 21 Courts have also expressed concern that recognizing
a professional degree as marital property will open a floodgate of litigation22 or will violate the thirteenth amendment of the United States
Constitution. 23
Recently, the Graham court's reasoning was rejected by the New
York Court of Appeals in O'Brien v. O'Brien. 24 The O'Brien court was
influenced by the legislative history and specific provisions of its equitable distribution statute. 25 In particular, the court found persuasive the

20.

21.

22.

23.
24.

25.

(Reversing trial court that had stated, "I'll tell you what the value of a law school
education is. It is zero.").
See In reMarriage of Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App. 3d 446, 461, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668, 678
(1979) ("The value of a legal education lies in the potential for increase in the future
earning capacity of the acquiring spouse. . . . A determination that such an asset is
community property would require a division of post-dissolution earnings to the
extent that they are attributable to the law degree.").
Id.
See O'Brien v. O'Brien, 106 A.D.2d 223, 227, 485 N.Y.S.2d 548, 551 ("What kind
of property are we all talking about? If it be property at common law it conjures up
all kinds of problems, constitutional and otherwise. Not alone a spouse, but every
judgment creditor of a debtor would be in a position to attach and execute against
such property. Such a proposition is filled with indescribable mischief and cannot
seriously be entertained."), modified, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 489 N.E.2d 712, 498 N.Y.S.2d
743 (1985); Lesman v. Lesman, 110 Misc. 2d 815, 817,442 N.Y.S.2d 955,957 (Sup.
Ct. 1981) ("If a medical license in and of itself has intrinsic value, then it would
follow that a license to practice law, to teach, to be a plumber, an engineer, a certified public accountant, and so on, on the theory of equal enforcement of the law,
would all be subject to Equitable Distribution."), modified, 88 A.D.2d 153, 452
N.Y.S.2d 935 (1982); see also Comment, For Richer or Poorer- Equities in theCareer-Threshold, No-Asset Divorce, 58 TUL. L. REV. 791, 795 (1984).
See Severs v. Severs, 426 So. 2d 992, 994 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) ("Such an award
... would trasmute the bonds of marriage into the bonds of involuntary servitude
contrary to Amendment XIII of the United States Constitution.").
66 N.Y.2d 576, 583, 489 N.E.2d 712, 715, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743, 746 (1985). The court
stated:
[Marital property] is a statutory creature, is of no meaning whatsoever
during the normal course of a marriage and arises full-grown, like Athena,
upon the signing of a separation agreement or the commencement of a
matrimonial action. Thus it is hardly surprising, and not at all relevant,
that traditional common law property concepts do not fit in parsing the
meaning of 'marital property.'
/d. (quoting Florescue, "Market Value," Professional Licenses and Marital Property:
A Dilemma in Search of a Horn, N.Y. ST. BAR Ass'N FAM. L. REv. 13 (Dec.
1982)). The court also stated, "whether a professional license constitutes marital
property is to be judged by the language of the statute which created this new species of property previously unknown at common law .... Thus, whether the license
fits within traditional property concepts is of no consequence." /d. at 586, 489
N.E.2d at 717, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 748. The court noted, however, that a professional
license may be cognizable as a valuable property right outside the context of its
statutory meaning; its value is reflected in the "money, effort and lost opportunity
for employment expended in its acquisition." /d.
O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 584-85,489 N.E.2d 712, 716, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743,
747 (1985) (citing N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW§ 236[B] (McKinney 1986)).
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statute's mandate that spousal contributions to the career or career potential of the other spouse be considered26 when the court makes a property distribution. When the interest can not be distributed, the statute
provides for a monetary award. 27 The court concluded that the legislature believed one spouse's contributions to the other's career "represent[s] investments in the economic partnership of the marriage and that
the product of the parties' joint efforts, the professional license, should be
considered marital property." 28 Except for New York's highest court,
only lower state courts have held that a professional degree is marital
property. 29
Nevertheless, a growing number of courts 30 recognize the unfairness
26. !d. at 584, 489 N.E.2d at 715-16, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 746-47. The statute reads in part:
In determining an equitable disposition of property under paragraph c, the
court shall consider: . . .
(6) any equitable claim to, interest in, or direct or indirect contribution made to the acquisition of such marital property by the party not
having title, including joint efforts or expenditures and contributions and
services as a spouse, parent, wage earner and homemaker, and to thecareer or career potential of the other party ....
N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW§ 236[B][5][d][6] (McKinney 1986).
27. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 584, 489 N.E.2d at 716, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 747. The statute
provides in part:
In any action in which the court shall determine that an equitable distribution is appropriate but would be impractical or burdensome or where the
distribution of an interest in a business, corporation or profession would be
contrary to law, the court in lieu of such equitable distribution shall make
a distributive award in order to achieve equity between the parties.
N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW§ 236 [B][5][e] (McKinneyl986).
28. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 584, 489 N.E.2d at 716, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 747. Members of the
legal community support the view that marriage is an economic partnership in
which the working spouse invests and, therefore, should share in the "human capital" of the student spouse. See Hodge v. Hodge, 337 Pa. Super. 151, 167, 486 A.2d
951, 960 (1984) (Wickersham, J., concurring and dissenting); Krauskopf, supra note
11, at 379; Weitzman, The Economic Consequences of Divorce: An Empirical Study
of Property, Alimony and Child Support Awards, 8 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 4037
(1982).
29. See, e.g., Reen v. Reen, 8 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2193 (Mass. Prob. and Fam. Ct.
1981) (holding the husband's license to practice orthodontia a marital asset and
subject to distribution); Woodworth v. Woodworth, 126 Mich. App. 258, 337
N.W.2d 332 (1983) (holding a law degree marital property). The Woodworth court
stressed the need to reach an equitable solution in light of the substantial contribution and sacrifice of the supporting spouse and remanded for a determination of the
present value of the husband's future earnings attributable to the law degree earned
during the marriage. Woodworth, 126 Mich. App. at 263, 269, 337 N.W.2d at 335,
337; see also Thomas v. Thomas, 131 Mich. App. 830, 346 N.W.2d 595 (1984) (following Woodworth). The precedentia1 value of Woodworth, however, is uncertain.
See Olah v. Olah, 135 Mich. App. 404, 354 N.W.2d 359 (1984) ("we do not adhere
to the proposition that a degree is property and therefore a marital asset"). In Carlson v. Carlson, 139 Mich. App. 299, 362 N.W.2d 258 (1984), the Court of Appeals
of Michigan acknowledged but did not resolve this conflict.
30. E.g., Inman v. Inman, 648 S.W.2d 847 (Ky. 1982); DeLaRosa v. DeLaRosa, 309
N.W.2d 755 (Minn. 1981); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488,453 A.2d 527 (1982);
Lehmicke v. Lehmicke, 339 Pa. Super. 559, 489 A.2d 782 (1985); Washburn v.
Washburn, 101 Wash. 2d 168, 677 P.2d 152 (1984); Haugan v. Haugan, 117 Wis. 2d
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that results when the degreed spouse is permitted to leave the marriage
with what is arguably its only asset. 31 These courts agree with the Graham dissent that "equity demands that the courts seek extraordinary
remedies to prevent [the] extraordinary injustice" 32 that will result unless
the supporting spouse is compensated. 33 Restitution in quantum meruit
is an appropriate remedy because the supporting spouse's personal sacrifices and financial contributions were made with a "reasonable expectation"34 that the degree would result in a higher standard of living for
both spouses. 35 Thus, unjust enrichment to the student spouse is
avoided. 36
When courts grant restitution, the nature of the award varies. "Reimbursement alimony," originated by the Supreme Court of New

31.

32.
33.

34.
35.

36.

200, 343 N.W.2d 796 (1984). See generally Brigner, I Put Him Through School ...
Now He Says We're Finished!, 4 ABA Fam. Advoc., Winter, 1982, at 16.
See Pyeatte v. Pyeatte, 135 Ariz. 346, 357,661 P.2d 196, 207 (1982) ("Appellant has
left the marriage with the only valuable asset acquired during the marriage - his
legal education and qualification to practice law."); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d
747, 751 (Okla. 1979) ("There is no reason in law or equity why Dr. Hubbard
should retain the only valuable asset which was accumulated through joint efforts,
i.e., his increased earning capacity, free of claims for reimbursement by his wife.");
Lundberg v. Lundberg, 107 Wis. 2d 1, 14, 318 N.W.2d 918,924 (1984) ("In a sense
[the husband's] medical degree is the most significant asset of the marriage. It is
only fair that [the wife] be compensated for her costs and foregone opportunities
resulting from her support while [her husband] was in school.").
Graham, 194 Colo. at 434, 574 P.2d at 78 (Carrigan, J., dissenting).
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma stated:
We have no quarrel with the Graham majority's resolution of the "property" question .... This determination does not mean, however, that Ms.
Hubbard is thereby precluded from receiving an award in lieu of property
division, for this case presents broad questions of equity and natural justice which cannot be avoided on such narrow grounds .... We are not
rendered impotent to do equity between these parties ... .
Hubbard, 603 P.2d at 750-51. See also Mahoney, 91 N.J. at 500,453 A.2d at 533-34
("[E]very joint undertaking has its bounds of fairness. . . . It is ... patently unfair
that the supporting spouse be denied the mutually anticipated benefit while the supported spouse keeps not only the degree, but also all of the financial and material
rewards flowing from it."); DeLaRosa v. DeLaRosa, 309 N.W.2d 755, 758 (Minn.
1981) ("The equities weigh heavily in favor of providing a remedy to the working
spouse in such a situation .... ").
DeLaRosa, 309 N.W. 2d at 758.
The Supreme Court of Arizona stated:
A benefit may be any type of advantage, including that which saves the
recipient from any loss or expense. Appellee's support of appellant during
his period of schooling clearly constituted a benefit to appellant. Absent
appellee's support, appellant may not have attended law school, may have
been forced to prolong his education ... or may have gone deeply into
debt .... Historically, restitution for the value of services rendered has
been available ... upon quasi-contractual grounds. . . . [A] quasi-contract
is not a contract at all, but a duty imposed in equity upon a party to repay
another to prevent his own enrichment.
Pyeatte, 135 Ariz. at 352-53, 661 P.2d at 202-03 (citations omitted). See also DeLa
Rosa, 309 N.W.2d at 758; Mahoney, 91 N.J. at 500, 453 A.2d at 533-34; Hubbard,
603 P.2d at 751; Haugan v. Haugan, 343 N.W.2d 796, 800 (Wis. 1984).
Haugan, 343 N.W.2d at 800.
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Jersey, 37 provides "a fair and effective means of compensating a supporting spouse who has suffered a loss or reduction of support, or has incurred a lower standard of living, or has been deprived of a better
standard of living in the future." 38 The court, however, cautioned that
reimbursement alimony is not a proper remedy in all cases. 39 For example, reimbursement alimony is unnecessary if sufficient property is available for distribution, or if rehabilitative alimony is appropriate. 40
Furthermore, alimony as the basis of an award is often inappropriate.41 Restrictions imposed on the alimony recipient may be deemed unacceptable.42 Moreover, some states prohibit an alimony award to a
spouse who is capable of self-support. 43 For these and other reasons, 44
courts often choose to grant a supporting spouse a monetary award based
on equitable principles "in the nature of recompense." 45
Courts also vary in the valuation method used when awarding restitution. Recoveries range from those limited to direct educational costs46
to broader recoveries encompassing educational and living expenses, 47
and any other related contribution. 48 Some courts also include the degree holder's potential for increased earnings in their calculations. 49 The
Supreme Court of New Jersey limited reimbursement alimony to those
financial contributions made "with the mutual and shared expectation"
that both spouses ultimately would reap the benefits of the professional
37. Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527 (1982).
38. Mahoney, 91 N.J. at 501, 453 A.2d at 534. The court explained, "Marriage should
not be a free ticket to professional education and training without subsequent obligations. . . . One spouse ought not to receive a divorce complaint when the other
receives a diploma." /d. at 503, 453 A.2d at 535.
39. /d.
40. /d.
41. Grosskopfv. Grosskopf, 677 P.2d 814, 821 (Wyo. 1984) ("there has been a tendency
away from alimony").
42. See Hubbard, 603 P.2d at 752 (recovery founded on alimony would force recipient
"to forego remarriage and perhaps even be celibate for many years").
43. See, e.g., DeLaRosa, 309 N.W.2d at 757 (citing MINN. STAT. § 518.552 (1980));
Lehmicke v. Lehmicke, 339 Pa. Super. 559, 567, 489 A.2d 782, 786 (1985) (citing
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23 § 40l(d)(4) (Purdon Supp. 1986)). See also In reMarriage
of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 435, 574 P.2d 75, 78-79 (1978) ("[T]he Colorado statute
would seem to preclude an award of maintenance here, for it restricts the court's
power to award maintenance to cases where the spouse seeking it is unable to support himself or herself.") (citing CoLO. REV. STAT.§ 14-10-114 (1973)). For a discussion of Maryland's alimony law, see infra notes 90, 93-99, and accompanying
text.
44. See Pyeatte, 135 Ariz. 346, 661 P.2d 196 (alimony not an issue before the court);
Hubbard, 603 P.2d at 751-52 ("Equity would not be served by holding ... that Ms.
Hubbard's recovery be limited to alimony for support and maintenance.").
45. Lehmicke, 339 Pa. Super. at 568, 489 A.2d at 787. See also DeLaRosa, 309 N.W.2d
755; Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747.
46. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747.
47. Pyeatte, 135 Ariz. 346, 661 P.2d 196.
48. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527; Lehmicke, 339 Pa. Super. 559, 489 A.2d 782.
49. In reMarriage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978); Inman v. Inman, 648
S.W.2d 847 (Ky. 1982); Haugan v. Haugan, 117 Wis. 2d 200, 343 N.W.2d 796
(1984).
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training. 50 The Supreme Court of Wyoming stated that an appropriate
award may be one that affords the working spouse "an opportunity to
obtain the same degree under the same circumstances." 51
Despite the considerable litigation, Indiana is the only equitable distribution state 52 whose legislature specifically has addressed the issue. In
1979, the following subsection was added to the Indiana Code:
When the court finds there is little or no marital property, it
may award either spouse a money judgment not limited to the
property existing at the time of final separation. However, this
award may be made only for the financial contribution of one
[1] spouse toward tuition, books, and laboratory fees for the
higher education of the other spouse. 53
Thus, Indiana provides an award of last resort that is limited to reimbursement, but does not allow a return on the working spouse's
investment.
In Maryland, a specially appointed Commission 54 drafted the Prop50. Mahoney, 9! N.J. at 503, 453 A.2d at 535.
51. Grosskopf v. Grosskopf, 677 P.2d 814, 823 (Wyo. 1984).
52. California, a community property state, also has enacted legislation that provides
for reimbursement of educational expenses that have benefited primarily one of the
spouses. The statute reads in part:
(b) Subject to the limitations provided in this section, upon dissolution of
marriage or legal separation:
(I) The community shall be reimbursed for community contributions to education or training of a party that substantially enhances the
earning capacity of the party. The amount reimbursed shall be with interest at the legal rate, accruing from the end of the calendar year in which
the contributions were made.
(2) A loan incurred during marriage for the education or training
of a party shall not be included among the liabilities of the community for
the purpose of division pursuant to Section 4800 but shall be assigned for
payment by the party.
CAL CIV. CODE§ 4800.3 (West 1984). See also Law Revision Commission Comment, CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800.3 (West 1984) ("Although the education, degree, or
license or the resulting enhanced earning capacity is not 'property' subject to division, community expenditures for them are properly subject to reimbursement.").
53. IND. CODE ANN.§ 31-1-11.5-ll(d) (Burns 1980 & Supp. 1986). By contrast, Pennsylvania courts have broad discretion in fashioning an appropriate remedy. The
statute provides in part:
In all matrimonial causes, the court shall have full equity power and jurisdiction and may issue injunctions or other orders which are necessary to
protect the interests of the parties or to effectuate the purposes of this act,
and may grant such other relief or remedy as equity and justice require
against either party or against any third person over whom the court has
jurisdiction and who is involved in or concerned with the disposition of the
cause.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23 § 40l(c) (Purdon Supp. 1986). In Lehmicke v. Lehmicke,
339 Pa. Super. 559, 567, 489 A.2d 782, 786-87 (1985), the court construed this
statute as authorizing a compensatory award to the working spouse for the financial
support given the student spouse.
54. See REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAWS
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erty Disposition in Annulment and Divorce Law 55 (Act) to remedy the
inequities inherent in the then existing title system of property distribution upon the dissolution of a marriage. 5 6 Under this system, the spouse
vested with title retained the property.57 A spouse who purchased property with joint funds, but titled it individually, was permitted to retain
the property upon dissolution of the marriage without compensating the
other spouse. 58 The title system did not recognize a homemaker's nonmonetary contributions to marriage. 59 The Commission believed its proposed Bill would provide fairer treatment to both spouses because
equitable distribution principles recognize both the monetary and nonmonetary contributions of spouses toward the acquisition of marital
property. 60
The Act does not mention professional degrees or career assets, nor
does it expressly provide compensation to a supporting spouse for contri-

55.

56.

57.

58.

59.

60.

1 (Jan. 1978) [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT]. The Commission's proposed Bill
was enacted with only slight modification.
1978 Md. Laws 2304 (codified at Mo. CTs. & Juo. PROC. CODE ANN.§§ 3-6A-01
to -08, recodified at Mo. FAM. LAW CODE ANN.§§ 8-201 to -213 effective October
1, 1984, amended 1986). See generally Legislation, Property Disposition Upon Divorce in Maryland: An Analysis of the New Statute, 8 U. BALT. L. REV. 377 (1979).
"The Commission, after painstaking and extensive deliberation, concluded that
what was needed in fact was a definition of the rights of the parties, in the disposition of property upon divorce or annulment, which would correct those inequities
that uncorrected historical development of the law has wrought .... " COMMISSION
REPORT, supra note 53, at 14. The purpose of the Marital Property Act is to "end
the inequity in Maryland's old 'title' system of dealing with the marital property of
divorcing spouses." Harper v. Harper, 294 Md. 54, 63, 448 A.2d 916, 920 (1982)
(quoting COMMISSION REPORT at 1).
See Legislation, supra note 54, at 380 n.26. If property was titled individually in the
name of one spouse, the court could neither transfer title nor grant a monetary
award to the non-titled spouse. /d. at 380-81 nn. 26-32. Thus, under prior Maryland law the issue in Archer could not have been maintained because the degree was
in the graduate's name.
See Woodall v. Woodall, 16 Md. App. 17, 293 A.2d 839 (1972). Although the
working wife contributed all her income to either her husband or the household, she
was denied a share of the value of stock purchased with money from a joint bank
account because the stock was purchased by the husband and titled in only his
name. /d.
See Gebhard v. Gebhard, 253 Md. 125, 130, 252 A.2d 171, 174 (1969). The wife
was awarded one-third of stock titled in her husband's name in recognition of her
services as homemaker and unsalaried secretary in her husband's business. The
court of appeals reversed the award stating, "No authority exists for a division [of
assets] between parties ... because of the work efforts of the parties." /d.
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 53, at 5.
The Commission does not believe that the people of Maryland today hold
the view that a spouse whose activities within the marriage do not include
the production of income has 'never contributed anything toward the
purchase' of property acquired during the marriage. Its members believe
that non-monetary contributions within a marriage are real and should be
recognized in the event that the marriage is dissolved or annulled.
/d. at 3 (referring specifically to Gebhard, 253 Md. 125, 252 A.2d 171). See also
Harper v. Harper, 294 Md. 54, 63, 448 A.2d 916, 919-20 (1982); Bender v. Bender,
282 Md. 525, 534 n.7, 386 A.2d 772, 778 n.7 (1978).
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butions to the student spouse's degree. 61 Under the Act, the court must
determine whether property is marital property, but it is given no guidelines in making this classification. 62 Marital property is defined as "property, however titled, acquired by [one] or both parties during the
marriage." 63 After the property is classified as marital property, it must
be valued. 64 The court may not change the title to property; in lieu of
actual distribution of property, the court may grant a monetary award to
either spouse "as an adjustment of the equities and rights of the parties
concerning marital property." 65 Nine specific factors must be considered
by the court in determining the amount and method of payment of the
award. 66 In addition, the court may consider any other factor it deems
necessary in order to achieve a fair and equitable award. 67
The Act was construed by the Court of Appeals of Maryland in
Deering v. Deering, 68 to include as marital property pension benefits that
accrued during marriage. 69 The court noted the "sweeping" language of
the Act and the broad and comprehensive meaning of the term "property" defined as "everything which has an exchangeable value or goes to
make up a man's wealth." 70 The court held that a vested pension is a
form of deferred compensation and not a mere expectancy. 71 The em61. Several bills have been proposed to the Maryland General Assembly that would
have required the court, when granting a monetary award under section 8-205, to
consider the contributions by one spouse toward the education or career potential of
the other spouse. See S. 2, 39lst Leg., 1987 Md. S. Bills; S. 14, 390th Leg., 1986
Md. S. Bills; H. 131, 390th Leg., 1986 H. Bills. These bills were all defeated and, in
fact, were unnecessary. See Mo. FAM. LAW CODE ANN.§ 8-205(a)(l0) (the court
may consider any factor it deems necessary or appropriate to achieve a fair and
equitable award).
62. See MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 8-203 (1984 & Supp. 1986).
63. /d. § 8-20l(e). The statute further provides:
(2) "Marital property" does not include property:
(i) acquired before the marriage;
(ii) acquired by inheritance or gift from a third party;
(iii) excluded by valid agreement; or
(iv) directly traceable to any of these sources.
/d.
64. /d. § 8-204.
65. /d. § 8-205(a).
66. Id. § 8-205(a)(l)-(9); see infra note 90.
67. /d. § 8-205(a)(l0).
68. 292 Md. 115, 437 A.2d 883 (1981).
69. Deering v. Deering, 292 Md. 115, 128,437 A.2d 883, 890 (1981). Section 8-205 was
amended in 1986 to allow the trial court to transfer "an interest in a pension, retirement, profit sharing, or deferred compensation plan" between spouses. Mo. FAM.
LAW CODE ANN. § 8-205 (Supp. 1986).
70. /d. at 125, 437 A.2d at 889.
71. /d. at 121-28, 437 A.2d at 890. The court adopted the reasoning of the Supreme
Court of California which held as marital property a non-vested pension. In re
Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633, 544 P.2d 561 (1976). The
Brown court explained that a contingent future interest is recognized at law as property, and the contingency is a valuation issue. Deering, 292 Md. at 128, 437 A.2d at
890 (citing Brown, 15 Cal. 3d at 847-88, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 638-39, 544 P.2d at 56667).
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ployee has a present property right in the pension; therefore, to the extent
accumulated during marriage, it is marital property. 72 Although the
pension is titled in only the employee's name, the spouse has an interest
in the amount that accrued during the marriage. 73
In Archer v. Archer, 74 the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a
medical degree or license is not marital property under the Act. 75 Restitution was unnecessary because compensation to the supporting spouse
presumably was achieved under the alimony statute. 76 The court reviewed the Act's legislative history and found nothing that indicated an
intent to include a professional degree within the meaning of marital
property. 77 Although the word property had been construed liberally in
Deering and other cases, 78 a professional degree or license does not possess any of the basic characteristics of property. 79 A degree is merely an
intellectual achievement, 80 and represents a future expectancy of enhanced earnings 81 that is "too uncertain and speculative" 82 to be marital
property. Therefore, a degree or license is not subject to equitable distribution through a monetary award under section 8-205 of the Act. 83
The Archer court has construed the Act correctly: its holding is
dictated by the use of the word "property" to define the statutory term
"marital property." 84 Because the word "property" is not defined in the
Act, the court analogized to prior case law and properly distinguished
72. Deering, 292 Md. at 127-28, 437 A.2d at 890 (citing Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 126 Cal.
Rptr. 633, 544 P.2d 561).
73. Deering, 292 Md. at 128, 437 A.2d at 890.
74. 303 Md. 347, 493 A.2d 1074 (1985).
75. Archer v. Archer, 303 Md. 347, 357, 493 A.2d 1074, 1079 (1985). Like almost all
other jurisdictions addressing the issue, the Archer court did not distinguish between
a professional degree and the license to practice. But see Moss v. Moss, 639 S.W.2d
370, 374 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982) (a pharmaceutical degree may be marital property,
but a license to practice may not).
76. Archer, 303 Md. at 359, 493 A.2d at 1081.
77. /d. at 357, 493 A.2d at 1079.
78. /d. at 356, 493 A.2d at 1079 (citing, inter alia, Deering v. Deering, 292 Md. 115, 437
A.2d 883 (1981)). See supra text accompanying notes 67-71.
79. /d. at 357, 493 A.2d at 1079 (citing In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 433,
574 P.2d 75, 77 (1978)).
80. Archer, 303 Md. at 357, 493 A.2d at 1079.
81. !d. (emphasis added). Income earned after the marriage's dissolution is not marital
property because by definition marital property is property acquired during the
marriage. !d. at 358, 493 A.2d at 1080. Accord Queen v. Queen, 308 Md. 574, 521
A.2d 320 (1987) (only that part of a spouse's lump sum permanent partial disability
award that compensates for loss of earning capacity during the marriage is marital
property); Green v. Green, 64 Md. App. 122, 494 A.2d 721 (1985) (stock options
acquired during marriage are marital property).
82. Archer, 303 Md. 357, 493 A.2d at 1080.
83. !d. The Archer court also acknowledged additional reasons for not holding a professional degree marital property: the degree's value is too speculative, and characterizing spousal contributions as an investment deserving recompense demeans marriage.
!d. at 352-53, 493 A.2d at 1077.
84. See Mo. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 8-201(e)(l) (defining marital property as "the
property, however titled, acquired by [one] or both parties during the marriage").
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Deering. 85 Unlike a pension, a professional degree has no exchange value
and may not be assigned to a spouse or any other person. 86 Although
both may be earned during marriage, a pension creates a present property right whereas a degree represents only an expectancy. 87 When the
parties' divorce follows closely upon attainment of the degree and before
the new career is embarked upon, this expectancy will not be realized
until after the marriage's dissolution. 88 Thus, because no right to income
accrues during marriage, the degree is not marital property. 89
Although the narrow holding of Archer is correct, the result is unfair and the Act's equitable purpose is not achieved. The Commission
and the Legislature focused on the unfairness that resulted upon the dissolution of a marriage when nonmonetary contributions to the accumulation of property were not recognized. 90 The Act, therefore, adequately
provides for property distribution upon the divorce of a "traditional"
couple where one spouse supported the family financially while the other
spouse contributed as homemaker. 91 As Archer demonstrates, however,
85. Archer, 303 Md. at 357, 493 A.2d at 1080-81; cf Deering v. Deering, 292 Md. 115,
437 A.2d 883 (1981).
86. Archer, 303 Md. at 357, 493 A.2d at 1080-81.
87. /d. A professional degree "does not have an assignable value nor does it represent a
guarantee of receipt of a set monetary amount in the future, such as pension benefits." /d. at 357, 493 A.2d at 1080.
88. Id. at 358, 493 A.2d at 1080.
89. /d.
90. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 53, at 3, 6; see also Bledsoe v. Bledsoe, 294 Md.
183, 189, 448 A.2d 353, 356 (1982).
91. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 53, at 3. If the "traditional" couple accumulated marital property during their marriage, the court may grant the homemaker
spouse a monetary award "as an adjustment of the equities and rights of the parties
concerning marital property, whether or not alimony is awarded." Mo. FAM. LAW
CODE ANN. § 8-205(a). Among the factors the court must consider in granting a
monetary award are:
(1) the contributions, monetary and nonmonetary, of each party to
the well-being of the family; ...
(3) the economic circumstances of each party at the time the award is
made; ...
(8) how and when specific marital property ... was acquired, including the effort expended by each party in accumulating the marital property
... ; [and]
(9) any award of alimony ... that the court has made ....
/d.
Whether or not a monetary award is granted, the homemaker spouse may be
awarded alimony. A monetary award is a factor to be considered by the court when
awarding alimony. /d. § 11-106(b)(ll)(ii). Other factors the court must consider
in granting alimony are:
(1) the ability of the party seeking alimony to be wholly or partly
self-supporting;
(2) the time necessary for the party seeking alimony to gain sufficient education or training to enable that party to find suitable
employment;
(3) the standard of living that the parties established during their
marriage;
(4) the duration of the marriage;
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the "university degree-divorce decree" case is not reached by the Act. 92
In this case, the working-homemaker spouse is in effect penalized for
providing, in addition to homemaking services, the financial support that
enabled the other spouse to attend school. The student spouse acquires a
degree "with the fruits of the wage earner spouse's labors" 93 that otherwise would have been saved or used to purchase tangible property. Had
the couple accumulated savings or other assets instead of a degree, those
assets would be marital property and the working-homemaker spouse
could receive a monetary award under the Act. 94
The Archer court incorrectly concluded that an adequate remedy is
available to a supporting spouse under the alimony statute. 95 The common law concept of alimony as a lifetime pension has been superseded by
rehabilitative alimony that is awarded for the purpose of providing the
dependent spouse an opportunity to become self-supporting. 96 Although
the sacrifices and contributions made toward the other spouse's degree
may be considered by the trial court in awarding alimony, 97 the court
also must consider "the ability of the party seeking alimony to be wholly
or partly self-supporting" 98 and the amount of time needed for that party
"to gain sufficient education or training to enable that party to find suitable employment. " 99 Permanent alimony may be awarded in only limited
circumstances, for example, when a dependent spouse is incapable of

92.

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

(5) the contributions, monetary and nonmonetary, of each party to
the well-being of the family ....
/d. § ll-106(b). In addition, the court may award alimony for an indefinite period
if:
(1) due to age, illness, infirmity, or disability, the party seeking alimony cannot reasonably be expected to make substantial progress toward
becoming self-supporting; or
(2) even after the party seeking alimony will have made as much
progress toward becoming self-supporting as can reasonably be expected,
the respective standards of living of the parties will be unconscionably
disparate.
/d. § 11-106(c).
As a result of the monetary award and alimony statutes, the court can ensure
that neither spouse in the "traditional" marriage is better off after the divorce because of sacrificies and benefits conferred during the marriage. See In re Marriage
of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885, 888 (Iowa 1978).
Section 8-205 is inapplicable and cannot be used to compensate a spouse's contributions to marriage when no marital property exists upon which to base the award.
See Ward v. Ward, 52 Md. App. 336, 449 A.2d 443 (1982) (a monetary award under
section 8-205 may not exceed the value of the marital property). Thus, only an
award payable out of future earnings will allow an equitable resolution to the "university degree-divorce decree" problem.
Deering v. Deering, 292 Md. 115, 124, 437 A.2d 883, 888 (1981).
See Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 500-01, 453 A.2d 527, 534 (1982).
Archer v. Archer, 303 Md. 347, 359, 493 A.2d 1074, 1081 (1985).
Campolattaro v. Campolattaro, 66 Md. App. 68, 502 A.2d 1068 (1986); Holston v.
Holston, 58 Md. App. 308, 473 A.2d 459 (1984).
Archer, 303 Md. at 359, 493 A.2d at 1081.
Mo. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § ll-106(b)(l).
/d. § ll-106(b)(2).
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achieving financial independence. 100 When the spouse seeking compensation was employed during the marriage and supported the family while
the other spouse pursued an advanced education, the working spouse has
demonstrated a capability of self-support and arguably is not entitled to
alimony under the statute. 101 Mrs. Archer, who worked throughout the
marriage to support the couple and their children, received only $100 per
month alimony for a period not to exceed one year. 102 The appellate
record does not disclose whether the trial judge, in awarding this
amount, felt constrained by the statutory limitations.
Despite the inadequacy of a statutory remedy based upon either alimony or a monetary award, the Archer court apparently was unwilling to
grant equitable relief. By choosing alimony as the appropriate remedy
and by ignoring restitution as an alternative, the court implicitly rejected
the alternative plea in equity for compensation. 103 Whether the court
was influenced by the appellant's failure to fully develop this avenue of
reliefl 04 or by the less than compelling facts of the case is unclear. 105
Because the court did not distinguish Archer from analogous cases in
other jurisdictions where restitution was awarded, 106 however, it is unlikely the court would have awarded restitution under more egregious
circumstances. Furthermore, the court's statement, "if public policy dictates that some economic compensation be made" to a supporting
spouse, 107 demonstrates the court's uncertainty concerning whether resti100.
101.
102.
103.

104.

105.
106.
107.

/d. § 11-106(c)(l).
See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying note 4.
Appellant's Brief at 4, Archer v. Archer, 303 Md. 347, 493 A.2d 1074 (1985). The
wife plead, "In the alternative, Appellant submits that she is entitled to compensation for the financial contributions and other support she provided Appellee while
he earned his medical degree and worked toward satisfying his residency requirement." /d. The court indirectly addressed this alternative plea for compensation
stating, "if public policy dictates that some economic compensation be made to a
spouse who makes monetary and nonmonetary contributions to the other spouse's
acquisition of a professional degree/license, equitable results can be achieved under
§ 11-106." Archer, 303 Md. at 359, 493 A.2d at 1080.
This alternative plea for restitution is referred to only twice in appellant's brief. See
Appellant's Brief at 4, 9, Archer v. Archer, 303 Md. 347, 493 A.2d 1074 (1985).
Appellant's discussion follows:
While conceding the split of authority on the issue before this Court, virtually all courts having refused to hold that a professional degree/license
constitutes marital property have nevertheless ruled that equity requires
the working spouse to be compensated in recognition for his or her contributions toward attaining the degree/license. These courts have generally
employed three methods to compensate the contributing spouse: 1) distribution of marital assets and liabilities; 2) some form of restitution alimony;
or 3) a monetary award based on equitable principles such as unjust
enrichment.
/d. at 9 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Appellant then turned to a discussion
of valuation and did not refer to alternative theories of compensation again.
See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 30-36.
Archer, 303 Md. at 359, 493 A.2d at 1081 (emphasis added).
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tution is an appropriate remedy in a "university degree-divorce decree"
case.
As the Indiana legislature 108 and a growing number of courts have
recognized, 109 "Marriage should not be a free ticket to professional education and training without subsequent obligations. . . . Those spouses
supported through professional school should recognize that they may be
called upon to reimburse the supporting spouses for the financial contributions they received in pursuit of their professional training." 110 Restitution is an appropriate remedy in these cases because the contributions
are made and accepted with the shared expectation that in the future
both parties will enjoy the rewards of the training. 111 Restitution ensures
a minimal measure of fairness in circumstances where it would be unjust
to allow the retention of a benefit without compensating the one who
conferred it. 112
The narrow issue before the Archer court was correctly decided: a
professional degree is not marital property. The case, however, depicts
an inherently unfair situation that was not foreseen by the Legislature
and was not addressed by the Archer court. Because the court appears
unwilling to adopt an equitable remedy in the "university degree-divorce
decree" case, the Legislature must act. Indiana's statute granting reimbursement to a supporting spouse provides a model statute for a compensatory award that should be followed in Maryland.

Shoshana L. Katz

108.
109.
110.
Ill.
112.

See supra text accompanying note 54.
See supra notes 30-36 and accompanying text.
Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488. 503, 453 A.2d 527, 535 (1982).
See DeLaRosa v. DeLaRosa, 309 N.W.2d 755,758 (Minn. 1981).
See Pyeatte v. Pyeatte, 135 Ariz. 346, 353, 661 P.2d 196, 203 (1982).

